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<http://itcourses.eu/>

Application Security

Identity Federation

Agenda

- Introduction
- OpenID Connect
- SAML2
- WS-Trust
- WS-Federation

Introduction

- Federation example:
 - Agreement between countries
 - So one can visit another country
 - Level of trust defines the rules
 - Schengen Area vs. North Korea
 - Federated Identity: passport



Introduction

- A federated identity in information technology is the means of linking a person's electronic identity and attributes, stored across multiple distinct identity management systems.

Introduction

- Federation
 - provides a mechanism where one identity is shared in different applications/companies
 - Is based on trust
 - Usually executed by a token-based system
 - E.g. SAML2, Open ID Connect, WS-Trust, WS-Federation
- Federation vs. SSO
 - Federation allows SSO without storing password
 - Otherwise, client needs to authenticate in every app
 - SSO is a subset of Federation
- Central Authentication Service (CAS)
 - Protocol for central authN for web applications
 - Not the same as SSO
 - One can log into APP1 and need to log again into APP2 (but centrally)
 - No federation is possible

Introduction

- In other words:
 - Federation: identity shared between realms
 - For instance: using a username in both companies, the same person is identified (first name, last name, e-mail, birth date, etc.)
 - SSO: user authenticates once for a set of applications
 - Can be implemented in different ways, e.g. based on session ID, token, storing the password, etc.

Introduction

- A scenario
 - 1 user (U) with a browser (B)
 - 2 applications (APP₁ and APP₂) in different realms
- Federation without SSO:
 - U visits APP₁ by the B and make an authN
 - A session is established between B and APP₁
 - U visits APP₂ by the B and make an authN again
 - Maybe with different password
 - A session is established between B and APP₂
 - Where is the additional value?
 - Even if the authN is required twice, the account is available in APP_{1/2}
- Federation with SSO
 - The same, but in step 3 authN is not required again
- What about SSO without Federation?
 - Credentials stored on the client
 - The same usernames are used in APP₁ and APP₂, but they are not federated

Introduction

- Basic terminology
 - IdP: Identity Provider
 - Authorization Server in Auth2
 - RP: Relying Party
 - Client in Auth2
 - STS: Security Token Service
 - Authorization Server in Auth2

Introduction

- Typical use-cases or challenges
 - Cross-domain
 - Web-based single sign-on
 - Cross-domain user account provisioning
 - Cross-domain entitlement management
 - Cross-domain user attribute exchange.

Introduction

- Some products supporting federation
 - Oracle Identity Federation
 - PingFederate Federation Server
 - Tivoli Federated Identity Manager (IBM)
 - AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM)
 - Identity Federation and Remote Access (F5)
 - CA Single Sign-On
 - Microsoft Azure Access Control Service
 - NetIQ Access Manager

Introduction

- Let's take a closer look on
 - Open ID Connect
 - SAML 2.0
- ... and a quick look on
 - WS-Trust
 - WS-Federation

OpenID Connect

Authentication & OAuth2

- It is quite popular that OAuth2 is abused for authentication
- The most common scenario is as follows:
 - User authenticates on AS
 - Afterwards an application exchange code for access token
 - The assumption is that if the application is able to get data using access token, then it means that user properly authenticated on AS

Authentication & OAuth2


- Main problems
 - OAuth2 is an authorization framework, there is no flow related to authentication
 - Although authentication is a part of the OAuth2 flow
 - The focus is on the client application, not on a user
 - In other words, authorization is for the client application, not for the user
 - After getting an access token, user is no more involved

Authentication & OAuth2

- Main issue with applying OAuth2 for authN
 - The goal is to provide a token which allows to get specific information
 - As a result there is only an access_token
 - There is no information about the user
 - If another app gets the token, only can obtain the same data
 - If used for authentication, app can impersonate the user
 - There is no additional verification who is the proper receiver of the token

Authentication & OAuth2

- An example where OAuth2 is not enough
 - Application get e-mails
 - ... but wants to not only show them, but also .e.g translate and store in the application
 - In this scenario we need identity, not only accesses
 - ID is never sent outside the application
 - And we don't built any auth services locally



Authentication & OAuth2

- Very good considerations
 - OAuth 2.0 and Sign-In
by Vittorio Bertocci
 - <http://www.cloudidentity.com/blog/2013/01/02/oauth-2-o-and-sign-in-4/>
 - The problem with OAuth for Authentication
by John Bradley
 - <http://www.thread-safe.com/2012/01/problem-with-oauth-for-authentication.html>

OpenID Connect

- The solution is the OpenID Connect
 - An authentication protocol built on top of OAuth2
 - We can consider OpenID Connect as a OAuth2 profile which defines a flow for authentication
 - Allows to get the information about the user
 - Adds ID Token where this information is stored
 - Emerging protocol, but has many implementations
 - Google is probably the best one
 - The main website:
<http://openid.net/connect/>
 - A very good introduction
 - <http://nat.sakimura.org/2012/01/20/openid-connect-nutshell/>
- Let's see the presentation video
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb56GzQ2pSk>
 - We will use the offline mode ☺

OpenID Connect Request

- To make a request the following information is required
 - Client ID
 - Client Secret
 - End-user authorization endpoint
 - Token endpoint
 - User info endpoint
- Additionally:
 - `grant_type = token id_token`
 - `scope = openid profile email ...`

OpenID Connect Request

- GET
 - /authorize?grant_type=token%20oid_token&scope=openid%20profile&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
HTTP/1.1
 - Host: server.example.com

OpenID Connect Response


- Beside access_token included in OAuth2 response, one gets id_token with the following information
 - aud (audience)
 - The client_id that this id_token is intended for.
 - exp (expiration)
 - The time after which this token must not be accepted
 - sub (subject)
 - A locally unique and never reassigned identifier for the user (subject)
 - E.g. "24400320" or "AltOawmwtWwcTok51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4".
 - iss (issuer)
 - A https: URI specifying the fully qualified host name of the issuer, which when paired with the user_id, creates a globally unique and never reassigned identifier.
 - E.g. "https://aol.com", "https://google.com", or "https://sakimura.org".
 - nonce - nonce value sent in the request.
- All these parameters are required

OpenID Connect Rules

- The following rules should be applied
 - An authorization server must only issue assertions about user identifiers within its domain
 - The client **MUST** verify that the aud matches its client_id and iss matches the domain (including sub-domain) of the issuer of the client_id
 - The authorization server is responsible for managing its own local namespace and enforcing that each user_id is locally unique and never reassigned
 - When the client stores the user identifier, it **MUST** store the tuple of the user_id and iss.
The user_id **MUST NOT** be over 255 ASCII characters in length


OpenID Connect Profiles

- Basic Client Profile
 - Based on OAuth2 code flow
 - Designed for a web-based relying parties
 - Subset of OpenId Connect Core specification
 - More: http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-basic-1_0.html



OpenID Connect Profiles

- Implicit Client Profile
 - Based on OAuth2 implicit flow
 - Designed for a web-based relying parties
 - Subset of OpenId Connect Core specification
 - More: http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-implicit-1_o.html



OpenID Connect Discovery and dynamic registration

- Discovery
 - Allows client app to
 - determine the identity of the End-User
 - Based on authentication performed in Authorization Server
 - obtain a basic profile of End-User
 - Uses WebFinger (RFC7033)
 - More: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html
- Registration
 - Allows client app to register on the server
 - More: http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html

OpenID Connect Playground

- A very good open source provider and a set of samples
 - <https://identityserver.github.io/Documentation/>
- Getting started videos
 - Introduction into the topic
 - <https://vimeo.com/113604459>
 - Provider introduction
 - <http://vimeo.com/91397084>
 - Walkthrough samples
 - <http://vimeo.com/91405115>

SAML2

Introduction

- Security Assertion Markup Language
- XML based protocol
- OASIS standard
 - SAML 1.0: 2002
 - SAML 1.1: 2003
 - SAML 2.0: 2005
- Flexible and extensible protocol

Definitions

- **Entity (or system entity):** An active element of a computer/network system
- **Principal:** An entity whose identity can be authenticated
- **Subject:** A principal in the context of a security domain

Definitions


- **Identity:** The essence of an entity, often described by one's characteristics, traits, and preferences
 - **Anonymity:** Having an identity that is unknown or concealed
- **Identifier:** A data object that uniquely refers to a particular entity
 - **Pseudonym:** A privacy-preserving identifier
- **Federated identity:** Existence of an agreement between providers on a set of identifiers and/or attributes to use to refer to a principal
 - **Account linkage:** Relating a principal's accounts at two different providers so that they can communicate about the principal

Definitions

- **Asserting party (SAML authority):** An entity that produces SAML assertions
 - **Identity provider:** An entity that creates, maintains, and manages identity information for principals and provides principal authentication to other service providers
- **Relying party:** An entity that decides to take an action based on information from another system entity
 - **Service provider:** An entity that provides services to principals or other entities

Roles & relationship


- User
 - Subject, principal
- Identity Provider
 - Asserting party
- Service Provider
 - Relying party



Main features

- Identity Federation
- SSO / Single Sign-Out
- Securing Web Services
- Attribute Services

SAML Concepts




Assertions

- An assertion is a declaration of fact, according to someone
- SAML assertions contain one or more statements about a subject:
 - Authentication statement
 - Joe authenticated with a password at 9:00am
 - Attribute statement (which itself can contain multiple attributes):
 - Joe is a manager with a \$500 spending limit

Assertions

■ Structure



Assertions

■ Example

```
<saml:Assertion
  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  ID="b07b804c-7c29-ea16-7300-4f3d6f7928ac"
  Version="2.0"
  IssueInstant="2004-12-05T09:22:05">
  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.org/SAML2</saml:Issuer>
  <ds:Signature
    xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">...</ds:Signature>
  <saml:Subject>
    <saml:NameID
      Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient">
      3f7b3dcf-1674-4ecd-92c8-1544f346baf8
    </saml:NameID>
    <saml:SubjectConfirmation
      Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
      <saml:SubjectConfirmationData
        InResponseTo="aaf23196-1773-2113-474a-fe114412ab72"
        Recipient="https://sp.example.com/SAML2/SSO/POST"
        NotOnOrAfter="2004-12-05T09:27:05"/>
      </saml:SubjectConfirmationData>
    </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
  </saml:Subject>
</saml:Assertion>
```



```
<saml:Conditions
  NotBefore="2004-12-05T09:17:05"
  NotOnOrAfter="2004-12-05T09:27:05">
  <saml:AudienceRestriction>
    <saml:Audience>https://sp.example.com/SAML2</saml:Audience>
  </saml:AudienceRestriction>
</saml:Conditions>
<saml:AuthnStatement
  AuthnInstant="2004-12-05T09:22:00"
  SessionIndex="b07b804c-7c29-ea16-7300-4f3d6f7928ac">
  <saml:AuthnContext>
    <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
      urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes>PasswordProtectedTransport
    </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
  </saml:AuthnContext>
</saml:AuthnStatement>
<saml:AttributeStatement>
  <saml:Attribute
    xmlns:x500="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500"
    x500:Encoding="LDAP"
    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
    Name="urn:oid:1.3.6.1.4.1.5923.1.1.1.1"
    FriendlyName="eduPersonAffiliation">
    <saml:AttributeValue
      xsi:type="xs:string">member</saml:AttributeValue>
    <saml:AttributeValue
      xsi:type="xs:string">staff</saml:AttributeValue>
  </saml:Attribute>
</saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
```

Assertions

- Example explained
 - In words, the assertion encodes the following information:
 - The assertion "b07b804c-7c29-ea16-7300-4f3d6f7928ac" was issued at time "2004-12-05T09:22:05Z" by identity provider (<https://idp.example.org/SAML2>) regarding subject (3f7b3dcf-1674-4ecd-92c8-1544f346baf8) exclusively for service provider (<https://sp.example.com/SAML2>).
 - The authentication statement, in particular, asserts the following:
 - The principal identified in the <saml:Subject> element was authenticated at time "2004-12-05T09:22:00" by means of a password sent over a protected channel.
 - Likewise the attribute statement asserts that:
 - The principal identified in the <saml:Subject> element is a staff member at this institution.

Artifacts

- A SAML message is transmitted from one entity to another either by value or by reference.
 - A **reference** to a SAML message is called an **artifact**.
- The receiver of an artifact resolves the reference by sending a request directly to the issuer of the artifact
- Sending references may have sources in:
 - Technical constraints, e.g. limited length of URL
 - Security reasons, e.g. to not expose secret data to a browser

Artifacts

- So, artifacts are a small, fixed-size, structured data object pointing to a typically larger, variably sized SAML protocol message
- Designed to be embedded in URLs and conveyed in HTTP messages
- Allows for “pulling” SAML messages rather than having to push them
- SAML defines one artifact format but you can roll your own

Protocols

- Assertion query and request
 - Query for existing assertion based on simple reference, subject-matching, or statement type, e.g. by <AssertionIDRequest>
- Authentication request (the most important one)
 - SP requests a fresh authn assertion that adheres to various requirements (specified by means of Authentication Context)
- Artifact resolution (“meta-protocol”)
 - Dereferences an artifact to get a protocol message
- Name identifier management
 - IdPs and SPs inform each other of changes to their mutual understanding of what a principal's name is
- Name identifier mapping
 - Privacy-preserving way for two SPs to refer to the same principal, e.g. by obtaining encrypted ID <saml:EncryptedID>
- Single logout
 - Signals to all SPs using the same session to drop the session

Bindings

- SOAP
 - Basic way for IdPs and SPs to send SAML protocol messages
- Reverse SOAP (PAOS)
 - Multi-stage SOAP/HTTP exchange that allows an HTTP client to send an HTTP request containing a SOAP response
- HTTP redirect
 - Method to send SAML messages by means of HTTP 302
- HTTP POST
 - Method to send SAML messages in base64-encoded HTML form control
- HTTP artifact
 - Way to transport an artifact using HTTP in two ways: URL query string and HTML form control
- URI
 - How to retrieve a SAML message by resolving a URI

Profiles


- Web browser SSO
 - SSO using standard browsers to multiple SPs: profiles Authn Request protocol and HTTP Redirect, POST, and artifact bindings
- Enhanced client and proxy (ECP)
 - SSO using ECPs: profiles Authn Request protocol and SOAP and PAOS bindings
- IdP discovery
 - One way for SPs to learn the IdPs used by a principal
- Single logout
- Name identifier management
 - Profiles the NIM protocol with SOAP, HTTP redirect, HTTP POST, and HTTP artifact bindings
- Artifact resolution
- Assertion query/request

Profiles

- Within profiles, different flows and binding choices are possible
 - E.g., in the web browser SSO profile:
 - Authn request from SP to IdP can use any of HTTP redirect or HTTP POST or HTTP artifact
 - IdP response to SP can use either HTTP POST or HTTP artifact
 - E.g., in the ECP SSO profile using the PAOS binding, two flows are possible:
 - ECP to SP, SP to ECP to IdP
 - IdP to ECP to SP, SP to ECP


Profiles

- Example 1: Browser/artifact flow, IdP-initiated



Profiles

- Example 2: Browser/POST flow, SP-initiated



Profiles

- More details one can see at Wikipedia
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAML_2.0#SAML_2.0_Profiles

Authentication context classes

- Internet Protocol
- Internet Protocol Password
- Kerberos
- Mobile One Factor Unregistered
- Mobile Two Factor Unregistered
- Mobile One Factor Contract
- Mobile Two Factor Contract
- Password
- Password Protected Transport
- Previous Session
- Public Key – X.509
- Public Key – PGP
- Public Key – SPKI
- Public Key – XML Signature
- Smartcard
- Smartcard PKI
- Software PKI
- Telephony
- Nomadic Telephony
- Personalized Telephony
- Authenticated Telephony
- Secure Remote Password
- SSL/TLS Cert-Based Client Authn
- Time Sync Token
- Unspecified

SAML 2.0 Metadata

- Provide information about entities in the flow
 - Identity Provider Metadata
 - SSO Service Metadata
 - Service Provider Metadata
 - Assertion Consumer Service Metadata
- The information allows to
 - Check correctness of service and identity providers
 - e.g. there is no phishing on the line
 - Validate the assertions based on the public keys
 - Find endpoint to resolve artifacts

References

- SAML V2.0 Basics

- <https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/12958/SAMLV2.0-basics.pdf>

- Wikipedia

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAML_2.0

- SAML 2.0 Core

- <https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>

- SAML 2.0 Bindings

- <https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf>

- Profiles for the OASIS SAML V2.0

- <https://svn.softwareboersen.dk/sosi-gw/tags/v1.0.1/vendor/doc/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf>

- Profiles explained

- <https://help.scorpionsoft.com/hc/en-us/articles/218317597-SAML-2.0-Profiles-explained-Building-your-own-SAML-integrations>

- ECP Profile

- <https://indico.egi.eu/indico/event/1019/session/46/contribution/262/material/slides/o.pdf>

WS-Trust

WS-Trust


- Actors & scenario example:
 - A wine web service (W-WS) with a policy
 - Policy says that a SAML token is required with
 - Age
 - Department Of Driving License (DODL)
 - A DODL web service (D-WS) with a policy
 - A user (U) who wants wine
- Every actor has a certificate with a private key

WS-Trust

- Dedicated to SOAP Web Services
- Based on
 - WS-Security
 - message authenticity, integrity, confidentiality
 - WS-SecurityPolicy
 - description of the security requirements of services via assertions about the security mechanisms of the services (i.e. algorithms and types of tokens that the service accepts).
- WS-Trust adds
 - Security Token Service
 - Protocol for requesting/issuing security tokens used by WS-Security and described by WS-SecurityPolicy

WS-Trust

- The flow (simplified)
 - U gets metadata from W-WS
 - U asks D-WS for a security token which fulfill policy
 - U authenticates and gets the security token
 - U uses the security token and buy a wine in W-WS



WS-Trust

- Terminology
 - D-WS we usually call Security Token Service (STS)
 - Or Identity Provider (IP)
 - W-WS we usually call Relying Party (RP)
 - U we usually call client

WS-Trust References

- A very good video

- <http://channel9.msdn.com/Shows/Going+Deep/Vittorio-Bertocci-WS-Trust-Under-the-Hood>

- Some introductions

- http://fusesource.com/docs/esb/4.4.1/cxf_security/WsTrust-Intro.html
- <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb498017.aspx>
- <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff650503.aspx>
- http://documentation.progress.com/output/lona/artix/5.5/security_guide_java/WsTrust-SSO-Example.html

- How to create a STS

- <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/dd347547.aspx>

WS-Federation

WS-Federation

- Federation
 - A collection of domains with a trust
 - Allows interactions between users, applications and other players
- Main Goal of WS-Federation
 - Simplify the development of federated services (FS) through cross-realm communication and management of Federation Services
 - Re-using the WS-Trust STS model and protocol.
 - Single Sign-On inside trust boundaries

Based on:


<http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsfed/federation/v1.2/os/ws-federation-1.2-spec-os.pdf>
<http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~acw/security/doc/Tutorials/WS-Federation.ppt>

WS-Federation

- WS-Trust makes possible to have a basic federation between IdP and RP
- WS-Federation
 - Adds Federation Metadata to simplify the setup of federated trust relationship between parties
 - Adds Single Sign On & Single Sign Off
 - Adds profiles for classic web applications
 - Adds mechanism for better discovery
 - Adds services for attributes and pseudonyms
 - Adds claims transformation

WS-Federation Profiles

- Active Requestor Profile
 - Focus on SOAP Web Services
- Passive Requestor Profile
 - Dedicated for browser client
 - Based on URLs
 - Uses redirections to send messages




WS-Federation

- Architecture of federation should be able to
 - Model business requirements
 - Leverage existing infrastructure
- Main trust topologies
 - Direct trust
 - Exchange
 - Validation
 - Indirect trust
 - Delegation

WS-Federation


- Supports different scenarios



(a) Direct connection (b) Firewall in between, trust by using certificates


WS-Federation Trust Topologies

- Direct trust with token exchange




WS-Federation Trust Topologies

- Direct trust with token validation




WS-Federation Trust Topologies

- Indirect trust



WS-Federation Trust Topologies

- Delegation



WS-Federation References

- Documentation

- Web Services Federation Language Version 1.2

<http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsfed/federation/v1.2/os/ws-federation-1.2-spec-os.pdf>

- Tutorials & presentation

- Understanding WS-Federation

<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb498017.aspx>

- Claims-Based Architectures

<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff359108.aspx>

- WS-Federation presentation

<http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~acw/security/doc/Tutorials/WS-Federation.ppt>

Summary

- In this presentation we've covered
 - Open ID Connect, SAML2, WS-Trust, WS-Fed
- The main goals in those protocols
 - Authenticate
 - Express statements about the subject
 - Support federation
 - Support different scenarios
 - In many cases the same ones